The Greenwave of GE15

TLMUN Herald
8 min readDec 15, 2023

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What is the greenwave in Malaysia’s GE15 election?

State polls: how far can the ‘green wave’ go?

Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), is an Islamist political party in Malaysia. Ideologically focused on Islamic fundamentalism. Its electoral stronghold lies predominantly in the rural and eastern coastal regions of Peninsular Malaysia, particularly gaining traction in the conservative northern states of Kelantan, Terengganu, Perlis, and Kedah. The party was a component party of the then governing Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition which came to power as a result of the 2020 – 21 Malaysian political crisis.

The term “green wave” characterises PAS’ remarkable success in the 15th general election (GE15), where the party achieved an unprecedented victory by securing 49 seats the highest in its history and surpassing all other contesting parties. This surge in support has positioned PAS as a formidable political force, particularly when compared to its historical standing and its main rival UMNO, which currently holds 26 seats.

The factors contributing to PAS’s electoral triumph include unforeseeable circumstances, strategic alliances, and effective messaging in recent years. UMNO, on the other hand, faced challenges arising from a series of corruption allegations, spanning from the era of former Prime Minister Najib Razak to the current leader Zahid Hamidi, who is undergoing corruption trials.

Reflecting on PAS’s political journey, the contrast between GE10 in 1999 and GE11 in 2004 provides insight into the party’s fluctuating fortunes. In GE10, PAS emerged as the leading opposition party, securing 27 parliamentary seats and taking control of the Terengganu state government. However, by GE11 in 2004, PAS experienced a downturn, winning only six parliamentary seats and facing challenges in retaining control of the Terengganu and Kelantan state governments.

When analysing the circumstances surrounding GE15 in 2022, it becomes evident that PAS’s success diverged from expectations. Traditionally associated with the northern Malay heartland states, PAS was not perceived as a major player in federal politics. However, the “green wave” narrative challenges these perceptions, indicating a substantial shift in voter support. Prior to GE15, PAS typically won between 18 and 23 seats in the last three general elections, making their remarkable showing in GE15 even more noteworthy.

This unexpected success suggests a significant swing in both existing and new voters, allowing PAS to secure victories beyond its traditional strongholds. PAS’s surge in GE15 goes beyond regional expectations, signalling a noteworthy transformation in its political influence and representation.

How did the green wave occur?

A resounding win for PN and PAS may further entrench Malaysia’s urban-rural and liberal-conservative divide.

PAS’s remarkable success is rooted in its adept differentiation from the pervasive corruption and internal conflicts plaguing well-established Malay parties, notably UMNO. The latter, reeling from the billion-dollar 1MDB corruption scandal, witnessed the downfall of former Prime Minister Najib Razak in 2018, culminating in his imprisonment this year. The present UMNO President, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, has recently been cleared of multiple bribery charges but continues to grapple with widespread unpopularity within various ethnic communities. However, PAS transcends the conventional boundaries of a mere political entity

The Perikatan Nasional (PN), particularly PAS, emerged as the primary beneficiary of new policies such as Automatic Voter Registration and UNDI18 (Vote18), which lowered the voting age to 18. Despite the newfound enfranchisement of under-18 citizens, their lack of political maturity, due to the absence of political education in Malaysia’s secondary schooling system often led to the inheritance of conservative or even extremist views from their parents. This phenomenon was exacerbated by the tendency of religiously-oriented Malay households to raise large families. Consequently, a surge in Malay-Muslim support for PN occurred, propelled by six million new voters, ironically a consequence of PH’s democratising initiatives during its initial tenure in power.

In both rural and select urban areas densely populated by Malay-Muslims, PAS members and sympathisers have established an intricate network of Islamic schools, spanning from kindergarten to upper secondary levels. While active segments of these student populations serve as potential sources for future PAS leaders, those unaffiliated with any political group are highly likely to vote for PAS, influenced by both peers and parental influence.

In essence, the substantial increase in Malay-Muslim support for PAS, and by extension, PN, during GE15 can be attributed to the community’s growing confidence in PAS as a steadfast defender of Malay-Muslim rights. This sentiment is compounded by disillusionment with UMNO, which demonstrated no remorse over corruption cases involving its leaders. Systemic factors, including PAS’s extensive grassroots networks in densely populated Malay-Muslim areas, further allowed it to assert its legitimacy as the primary advocate for Islam within the predominantly Malay-centric PN coalition.

Despite BN’s inclusion as a component member in Anwar Ibrahim’s unity government, the task of regaining Malay-Muslim trust remains a formidable challenge for UMNO. The party’s continual involvement in federal affairs in Putrajaya, coupled with its preoccupation with upcoming party elections, may only serve to further distance them from their traditional grassroots voters.

PAS’ Effective Social Media Campaigns

TikTok users in Malaysia increased by 14.4 million in the past two years despite Facebook still having the most users at 21 million users in Malaysia.

Social media played a crucial role in garnering votes, with TikTok as a focal point, PAS effectively crafted an impression that the Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition would inadequately safeguard Malay privileges, then perceived as being under threat. Misunderstandings regarding PH’s economic policies, which were purportedly detrimental to Malays during its 22-month tenure, including subsidy reductions impacting fishermen and rubber smallholders, as well as insensitive remarks from DAP figures regarding Islam, the Malay language, and Malay royalty, became the cornerstone of Perikatan Nasional’s (PN) campaign narrative.

Despite numerous debunked rumours, a recent Bernama report claimed that Penang intends to formalise a ban on the use of loudspeakers outside mosques and suraus, allowing only the call to prayer. The report, based on a letter from the Penang Mufti’s Office dated September 1, indicated a prohibition on loudspeakers for Quran readings before dawn, all programs, and meetings. This decision sparked criticism and allegations from Umno leaders, who accused the Penang DAP government of being anti-Islam. Some even claimed the ban included the call to prayer, suggesting it could incite Muslim anger against the DAP-led Penang administration. The Penang government has vehemently denied any involvement in the issue, asserting that it has never interfered in decisions made by the state mufti’s office or the fatwa committee.

Eventually, the persistent circulation of these rumours significantly influenced rural and semi-urban Malay communities heavily reliant on social media as their primary news source. During the final stages of campaigning, PN Chairman Muhyiddin Yassin courted controversy by linking PH to an alleged overseas-directed plot to Christianize Malays. Even more than a week after GE15, accusations of Anwar Ibrahim being an Israeli agent continued to be propagated by PN figures, leading to the filing of police reports against them.

PH faced additional challenges from the religious and race-baiting tactics employed by PAS extremists. For instance, Mohd Shahiful Mohd Nasir, the PAS Youth chief in Sik, Kedah, declared that those voting for BN and PH were destined for Hell. On PAS’ campaign trail, actor Zul Huzaimy publicly expressed his intent to confront non-Muslims (kafir harbi) opposing the implementation of Islamic rule.

Despite disavowals from PAS’ central leaders regarding both statements, the inflammatory remarks had already left an indelible impact by the time the extremists retracted their statements or were dissociated from the party.

Of particular concern is a coordinated anti-Chinese social media campaign post-election, notably on TikTok, targeting the Democratic Action Party and advocating for the Perikatan Nasional coalition, including PAS, to take power. Referencing the racial violence of May 13, 1969, this campaign has exacerbated ethnic tensions, potentially leading to detrimental consequences in the future.

PAS influence in Malaysian politics and its implications

In the historical context of Malaysian politics, ethnic divisions have traditionally played a crucial role, with UMNO dominating the political landscape by mobilising the Malay electorate based on ethnicity and Malay nationalism. However, PAS has strategically positioned itself as a challenger to UMNO’s narrative, appealing to Malays who are constitutionally obligated to profess the Muslim faith. This is particularly evident in Kelantan and Terengganu, where PAS enacted Syariah legislations in 1993 and 2002, respectively, emphasising the intentional upholding of Islamic values.

Established in 1951, PAS aimed to challenge UMNO’s secular stance, seeking to elevate the constitutional status of Islam. Dr. Burhanuddin al‐Hemi, PAS’ third leader, emphasised merging Malay nationalism with Islamic aspirations, accusing UMNO of compromising Malay interests for electoral gains. Pursuing an incremental approach within Malaysia’s democratic framework, PAS aspired towards its ultimate goal of Islamic governance.

PAS’s electoral success in 1959 marked the beginning of a rivalry with UMNO, securing control over Kelantan and Terengganu, along with 13 national parliamentary seats. The 1969 elections deepened this rivalry, with PAS capturing nearly half of the Malay‐Muslim vote.

Controlling two states Kelantan and Terengganu, where Islamic laws are practised, PAS’s success poses uncertainties in Malaysia’s unresolved political landscape. Whether assuming a government role or not, PAS has firmly established itself as a national-level political force, capable of swaying a significant portion of the ethnic Malay vote.

However, the concern arises as many Malays voted along the lines of race and religion rather than evaluating governance quality. According to the ILHAM Centre, 46% of voters in Kedah prioritise a coalition emphasising the Malay-Muslim agenda over one promising better governance. This sentiment is even more pronounced in Terengganu and Kelantan, where 55% and 73% of respondents, respectively, prioritise a Malay-Muslim struggle coalition, compared to those wanting a well-governed government. This issue becomes evident as politicians might escape accountability for poor governance, as illustrated by the prolonged water supply issues in Kelantan during PAS’ 33-year rule in the east coast state. The ongoing water supply problem, locally known as “air karat” (rusty water), has persisted without effective solutions.

The resurgence of political Islam prompts questions about its sustainability within Malaysia’s multi-ethnic demographic. Concerns are heightened by a post-election anti-Chinese social media campaign on platforms like TikTok, potentially disrupting Malaysia’s multi-ethnic fabric. Political analyst Trica Yeoh notes a shift among younger voters identifying more as Muslims than Malaysians, fueling conservative views accentuated by the COVID-19 crisis. Dr. Bridget Welsh highlights a swing towards ultra-Malay conservative Islamist forces, led by young voters, jeopardising Malaysia’s social cohesion and economic investments.

Political manoeuvring complicates the landscape for parties like the Democratic Action Party (DAP) to gain traction among conservative Malays, often labelled as too liberal and perceived to undermine traditional Malay values and Islamic principles. Despite these trends, Ms. Yeoh emphasises the need to avoid sweeping generalisations, noting that the majority of Malaysia is still characterised as traditional rather than conservative.

Conclusion

In essence, Malaysia’s 15th general election (GE15) witnessed the unprecedented rise of PAS, symbolised by the so-called “green wave.” PAS, in a strategic alliance with Bersatu, secured a historic 43 seats in the Dewan Rakyat, outperforming long-standing political players. This triumph marked a significant shift from PAS’s historical influence, especially in its heartland states of Terengganu, Kelantan, Perlis, and Kedah, to a national political force. As Malaysia grapples with the implications of PAS’s success and the broader changes in political dynamics, it is crucial to navigate the complex terrain of race, religion, and governance. The challenge lies in striking a balance that respects diverse identities while fostering unity and progress for the nation as a whole.

[Written by: Harshaall Medha Naidu, Edited by: Teoh Jin]

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TLMUN Herald
TLMUN Herald

Written by TLMUN Herald

A not-for-profit publication under the Taylor’s Lakeside Model United Nations Club which focuses on amplifying the voices of the youth of today.

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